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Abstract 
Research on explanation has primarily focused on event 
explanations, overlooking how we explain properties. A 
qualitative study revealed that when people explained a 
property of an entity, they regularly referred to another 
property to provide an explanation. Why axes are dangerous 
was explained by their property of being sharp. The present 
study looked at what affects the relative plausibility of such 
explanations. A set of 224 explanations of the form ‘x has p 
because it has q’ were judged for plausibility. Measures of 
counterfactual relations between the two properties (i.e. 
likelihood of having p without q), co-occurrence and 
mutability of each property, as well as a measure of 
conceptual coherence based on network diagrams (Sloman, 
Love & Ahn, 1998) were used in a regression analysis to 
predict plausibility. Conceptual coherence followed by 
counterfactuals were the strongest predictors of plausibility in 
a model explaining almost 56% of the variance in plausibility 
of property explanations. 
Introduction 
Explanations come in a range of different forms and guises. 
They answer why-questions about people’s behavior, 
provide accounts of physical processes and shed light on the 
occurrence of events. The diversity of explanation has led 
some to suggest that explanations might not constitute a 
uniform phenomenon (Keil & Wilson, 2000).  
Despite this diversity of explanations, theoretical and 
empirical research on explanation has focused on events, i.e. 
explanations of why a particular event occurred. For 
instance, Hempel’s deductive nomological model was only 
intended to cover singular events as remarked in a footnote 
in Hempel and Oppenheim’s original paper: 
“Our analysis will be restricted to the explanation of 
particular events, i.e. to the case where the 
explanandum, E, is a singular sentence.” (Hempel & 
Oppenheim, 1948, p.159) 
Similarly Salmon’s (1998) and Lewis’s (1986) causal 
theories of explanation refer to the causal history of an event 
in terms of a succession of events that constitute its 
explanation.  
Theories in psychology like attribution theory (Ajzen & 
Fishbein, 1975; Heider, 1958, Hilton & Slugoski, 1986) and 
its modern derivatives in the form of Bayes Nets (Glymour, 
2000) and Causal Power Theory (Cheng, 1997) mirrored 
this emphasis on events in theorizing about explanations. 
This preoccupation with events has left a gap in the 
literature on how we understand, judge and generate 
explanations of properties.  
Property Explanations 
Properties are attributes, features and characteristics of 
things. In Philosophy there is an ongoing debate about the 
nature of properties, whether they exist without being 
instantiated and whether they can do any explanatory work 
at all (Swoyer, 1996). However, here the focus was on how 
people understand and judge explanations of properties. We 
take properties to be any descriptive phrase that people 
consider to apply generally to an object or natural kind. In 
fact, the properties used here were all sampled from a 
database based on a feature generation task for a range of 
different concepts (Cree & McRae, 2003). As a 
consequence, these properties are mostly enduring 
characteristics that generally apply to the class of things in 
question. In addition superordinate category membership 
was also considered a property of the entities.  
Explanations of properties are ubiquitous in everyday life. 
We wonder why structurally complex organisms are mostly 
diploid, why flat pack assembly instructions have to be so 
complicated and why most leading conservative politicians 
are so badly dressed. Questions about properties sometimes 
seem more fundamental than questions about events. They 
are about the characteristics of things that endure and 
sometimes define or make the entity what it is. They ask 
about the system of the entity, the underlying nature and the 
interplay of properties and therefore seem less likely to be 
explicable circumstantially. As the focus of research on 
explanation has so far been on events, it is of considerable 
interest to explore how we understand and judge 
explanations of properties.  
In this paper the focus was on a particular type of 
explanation of properties. In an exploratory study we found 
that when people were asked to generate an explanation for 
a property of an object they regularly referred to another 
property of that object to provide the explanation. For 
instance, participants consistently refer to the rarity of 
emeralds when asked to explain why they are expensive. 
Property explanations commonly took the following form:  
Xs have p because they have q 
where ‘p’ and ‘q’ are two properties of the concept ‘X’. The 
natural question that arose was what determines whether ‘q’ 
is a good explanans for ‘p’ in any given X. That is the 
question that we address in this paper. 
 Study 
The overall aim of our study was to investigate the 
determinants of plausibility in property explanations.  
Regression analysis was used to establish the relative 
contribution of a range of predictors to the plausibility of 
property explanations. The predictors consisted of measures 
of causal, statistical and local coherence relations between 
properties and a global measure of feature centrality for 
individual properties. Pairs of properties were selected and 
each property pair was tested in both directions for each 
measure. This enabled us to test whether property 
explanations exhibit symmetry; i.e. where two properties are 
equally able to explain one another. For instance, do people 
judge ‘Emeralds are expensive because they are rare’ as 
equally plausible as ‘Emeralds are rare because they are 
expensive’. Similarly the causal, statistical and dependence 
relations were measured in both directions.  
Method 
Materials A sample of 28 natural kind and 28 artifact 
concepts was randomly drawn from Cree and McRae’s 
(2003) database. Using the same database two properties for 
each concept were drawn at random and two additional 
properties were selected so that roughly equal numbers of 
property types (see Wu & Barsalou’s, 2002 classification) 
were present in each of the two domains.  
The four properties per concept were paired up to create 
two pairs such that at least one of the resulting explanations 
seemed plausible to the experimenter. For instance the four 
properties ‘having a siren’, ‘being a vehicle’, ‘being large’ 
and ‘being used for emergency’ for the concept 
‘Ambulance’ could be paired up in three different ways. The 
relation between ‘having a siren’ and ‘being used for 
emergency’ seemed most likely to produce a plausible 
explanation, and consequently this pairing was adopted.  
Each pair of properties was used to generate two 
explanations (e.g. “Axes are dangerous because they are 
sharp.” vs. “Axes are sharp because they are dangerous.”) 
resulting in four explanations per concept. The exact same 
principal applied to co-occurrence judgments (e.g. “Of all 
man-made things that are dangerous, what percentage is also 
sharp?” vs. “Of all man-made things that are sharp, what 
percentage is also dangerous?”) and counterfactuals (e.g. “If 
axes were not dangerous, would they be sharp?” vs. “If axes 
were not sharp, would they be dangerous?”).  
Mutability was judged for each property individually (e.g. 
“How difficult is it to imagine axes that are not dangerous?” 
vs. “How difficult is it to imagine axes that are not sharp?”). 
Dependence was measured by network diagrams consisting 
of the concept with all four properties displayed. 
Participants saw all 56 concepts and were asked to draw 
arrows between the properties of a concept indicating the 
strength of the dependence by using different colors. Based 
on pilot work, participants were asked to consider carefully 
the direction of the dependence, and only to draw 
bidirectional arrows if they were convinced that they 
applied. (see Figure 1; a solid line represents the strongest 
dependence relation, a dotted line represents weakest 
dependence). Arrows are drawn from one property to a 
property that it depends on. The full set of measures is 
illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Participants A total of 386 participants were recruited for 
the five different measures. The three paper-based measures 
were collected at City University London with a total of 80 
participants each for co-occurrence and plausibility 
judgments and 21 for the dependence measure. The sample 
size was 109 and 96 for counterfactuals and mutability 
respectively. The whole sample consisted of University 
undergraduate and postgraduate students with an average 
age of 22 years. The majority (88%) were native English 
speakers with the remainder having a high command of 
English as their second language. 
 
Procedure & Design The complete set of 224 items was 
divided into four subsets, each of which contained one of 
the four explanations per concept. Each questionnaire 
therefore contained 56 target items with an additional four 
warm-up items at the beginning of each questionnaire. Two 
different random orders of items were used for each 
questionnaire. Each subset and each measure was completed 
by different groups of participants. Counterfactuals and 
mutability were collected online using a website and 
recruitment took place via email. The paper-based 
questionnaires were collected in classrooms. For each 
measure, participants had the chance to win a £20 voucher 
from Amazon as an incentive to participate.  
Results 
All measures had a Cronbach Alpha between .88 and .94 
(see figure 2). The data were averaged across participants 
for each of the measures and the analyses were carried out 
on the individual items. All variables apart from the 
dependence measure were roughly normally distributed. 
Dependence was consequently transformed by taking the 
square root of its values. In the analyses that follow the 
transformed version of both dependence measures were 
used.  
Axes:
have a blade
are sharpare dangerous
are 
tools
Arrows point to properties that are being depended 
on, e.g. being sharp depends on having a blade.  
Reliability: (r = .88)
Strong:                   Medium:                  Weak:     
Figure 1. Dependence Net Diagrams
  
First we compared the average scores across domains 
(artifact vs. natural kind) on each of the measures using a 
one-way multivariate analysis of variance. Results of 
evaluation of assumptions of normality, homogeneity of 
variance-covariance matrices, linearity and multi-
collinearity were satisfactory. 
The combined dependent measures were significantly 
affected by domain, F(5, 218) = 6.63, p < .001. Although 
significant, the results only showed a small association 
between domain and the combined dependent variables, 
partial 2 = .13, reflecting the small effective difference 
between the two domains across the different measures.  
In univariate ANOVAs of each measure only plausibility 
(F(1, 222) = 20.03, p < .001) and counterfactuals (F(1, 222) 
= 12.75, p < .001) showed significant differences between 
the two domains. Pairs of artifact properties produced both 
more plausible explanations and were more counterfactually 
dependent on each other than those of natural kinds (see 
Table 1).  
 
Property Explanations across Property Types. Table 2 
provides frequencies of plausible explanations (items that 
were rated above 5 on a 10-point scale for plausibility) 
broken down by the different property types for the two 
positions    in    the   explanation   and    the   two   domains.  
 
Table 1:  Domain Differences with Mean and (Standard 
Deviation) for each Measure. 
 
 Natural Kind Artifact 
Plausibility  4.11 (1.40)  5.09  (1.80) 
Dependence  0.64  (0.64)  0.74  (0.65) 
Counterfactuals  2.17  (0.75)  2.58 (0.94) 
Mutability  5.76 (1.80)  5.58  (2.00) 
Co-occurrence  48.61 (18.0) 49.93 (21.0) 
 
 
Starting with natural kinds we can see that out of the 24 
plausible explanations 10 (42%) had a superordinate 
property in the ‘q’-position. A further 6 explanations 
consisted of a superordinate property in the ‘p’-position 
resulting in two thirds of all plausible property explanations 
for natural kinds containing a superordinate in either the ‘p’ 
or the ‘q’-position.  
For artifacts, the 52 plausible explanations were more 
evenly distributed across the different property types with 
components (44.2%) and functions (25%) being the most 
strongly represented property types in ‘q’-position with a 
similar distribution for the ‘p’-position.  
However, taking the base rate of the different property 
types into account revealed a different picture. Figure 3 
represents the proportion of plausible explanations over the 
total number of explanations for each property type. Of all 
explanations that contained a function in ‘q’-position 86% 
were plausible, compared with only 47% of property 
explanations containing a component in q position. Thus 
despite the range of property types in plausible explanations 
for artifacts, taking the base rate of the different property 
types into account there was a clear dominance of functional 
properties as explanations for artifacts.  
 
Correlation and Regression  The pattern of correlations 
was virtually the same in each domain in terms of rank order 
and absolute strengths. Regression models including all 
predictors for the two domains were compared by 
calculating the difference in regression coefficients across 
domain. Comparing all significant predictors in either 
domain with their counterpart in the other domain showed 
no differences greater than two standard errors. In addition, 
a principle components analysis showed the same pattern of 
loadings for the two domains. Both domains produced a two 
factor solution with artifacts showing smaller cross-loadings 
than natural kinds. Thus, in what follows the items were 
collapsed across domains. 
 
 
Table 2:  Distribution of property type pairing across domains and position. 
 
Natural Kind       Artifact      
 ‘q’ – position    ‘q’ – position  
‘p' – position Component Function Superordinate Other Total 'p'  ‘p' - position Component Function Superordinate Other Total 'p' 
Component 0 0 6 2 33%  Component 10 7 3 4 46% 
Functional 3 0 0 2 21%  Functional 8 0 1 3 23% 
Superordinate 3 0 0 3 25%  Superordinate 4 1 0 0 10% 
Other 1 0 4 0 21%  Other 1 5 3 2 21% 
Total 'q': 29% 0% 42% 29% 24  Total 'q': 44% 25% 13% 17% 52 
Concept: Axes
Property p: dangerous Property q: sharp
Plausibility Judgments (p > q): X has p because it has q 
How plausible is the explanation?    {r =  .88 - .92}*
Axes are dangerous because they are sharp. 
Dependence (p>q) p depends on q {r = .88}
For axes being dangerous depends on being sharp.
Dependence (q>p) q depends on p
For axes being sharp depends on being dangerous.
Counterfactuals (¬ p): If not p then q? {r = .90 - .95}
If axes were not dangerous would they be sharp? 
Counterfactuals (¬ q): If not q then p?
If axes were not sharp would they be dangerous?
Co-occurrence (%q in p): Percentage of q in p {r = .90 - .93}
Of all man-made things that are dangerous, 
what percentage is sharp? 
Co-occurrence (%p in q): Percentage of p in q
Of all man-made things that are sharp, 
what percentage is dangerous? 
Mutability (mu - p): Mutability of p {r = .93 - .94}
How difficult is it to imagine axes that are not dangerous?
Mutability (mu - q): Mutability of q
How difficult is it to imagine axes that are not sharp?
(*Numbers in brackets indicate reliability range for each measure across four stimuli sets)
Figure 2. Summary of all Measures
  
 
Table 3 shows the correlations between plausibility and 
the significant predictors. In line with our predictions both 
dependence (p>q) (r = .625) and counterfactual (¬q) (r = 
.567) were strongly correlated with plausibility (p>q). 
Mutability (mu-q) (r = .319) and co-occurrence (%p in q) 
(r = .305) were only moderately correlated with 
plausibility. Interestingly the other co-occurrence measure 
(%q in p) (r = .372) had just as strong a correlation with 
plausibility as its converse. For example, “axes are 
dangerous because they are sharp” is rendered more 
plausible as an explanation if a high percentage of 
dangerous things tend to be sharp (%q in p), as well as if a 
high percentage of sharp things tend to be dangerous (%p 
in q)  
In the instructions for the dependence diagrams 
participants were asked to choose and only draw the 
stronger direction of the two dependence relations. As a 
result the two complement dependence measures showed 
a small but significant negative correlation (r = -.132, p < 
.05). For all the other predictors there were no significant 
correlations between the two complements. The only 
other correlation among complements that was significant 
was for plausibility (r = .441, p < .001) indicating that 
many property explanations work in both directions.  
Suprisingly we found that a number of explanations 
were equally plausible in both directions. For instance, 
‘Whistles are used for alerting because they are loud’ was 
as plausible as ‘Whistles are loud because they are used 
for alerting.’ This symmetry was more prominent for 
artifacts. Nevertheless some natural kind explanations 
also showed symmetry; (e.g.) ‘Carrots are roots because 
they are found underground’ and ‘Carrots are found 
underground because they are roots.’  
The overall aim of the study was to establish a model to 
predict plausibility judgments of these property 
explanations. A regression using backwards elimination 
with plausibility (p>q) as dependent variable and each of 
the two variables for counterfactuals, co-occurrence, 
mutability and dependence as predictors was carried out.  
Dependence (p>q) turned out to be the strongest 
predictor of plausibility (p>q) followed by the equally 
strong counterfactuals (¬q) and (¬p) and then mutability-
q. Table 3 provides the results for the final regression 
model. Overall the model predicted 56% of variance in 
plausibility judgments. Neither of the two co-occurrence 
measures entered the model despite their moderate 
positive correlations with plausibility. Interestingly 
despite the weak correlations with plausibility both 
complement measures of dependence (q>p) and 
counterfactuals (¬p) entered the model. Dependence 
(p>q) turned out to be the strongest predictor of 
plausibility (p>q) followed by the equally strong 
counterfactuals (¬q) and (¬p) and then mutability-q. Table 
3 provides the results for the final regression model 
arrived at by backwards elimination. Overall the model 
predicted 56% of variance in plausibility judgments. 
Neither of the two co-occurrence measures entered the 
model despite their moderate positive correlations with 
plausibility. Interestingly despite the weak correlations 
with plausibility both complement measures of 
dependence (q>p) and counterfactuals (¬p) entered the 
model. 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Regression Table for the final model with plausibility as dependent variable. 
 
 Plausibility 
(p>q) 
Dependence 
(p>q) 
Counterfactual 
(¬p) 
Counterfactual 
(¬q) 
Dependence 
(q>p) 
Mutability 
-q B Beta 
Dependence (p>q) 0.625**      2.010 .478 
Counterfactual (¬p) 0.299** -0.004     .474 .241 
Counterfactual (¬q) 0.567** 0.546** 0.094    .441 .224 
Dependence (q>p) 0.182** -0.132* 0.546** -0.004   .522 .124 
Mutability-q -0.319** -0.281** 0.194** -0.396** 0.065  -.133 -.151 
Mean 4.59 .69 2.37 2.37 .69 5.67 R2 .569 
StD. 1.70 .64 .41 .41 .64 1.94 Adj. R2 .559 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Plausible explanation over total no. of 
explanations by domain and property type
Plausible explanations for each domain broken down by property 
type in 'q' - position
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 A further point to note was that, despite dependence 
having the lowest Cronbach alpha with .88, it turned out to 
have the greatest influence on plausibility. In theory two 
equally strong predictors would show differential influence 
on the dependent variable as a result of their reliability with 
the variable with higher reliability showing a stronger 
influence. Thus, despite the slight underestimation of the 
influence of dependence (p>q) on plausibility, it turned out 
to be the strongest predictor in this model. However the 
correlation between dependence (p>q) and plausibility (p>q) 
(r = .625) was not significantly different from the 
correlation between counterfactual (¬q) and plausibility 
(p>q) (r = .567), which means that counterfactual (¬q) could 
have equally turned out to be the strongest predictor. Thus 
no strong claims can be made here about the dominance of 
one of the two measures over the other.  
Discussion 
Property explanations were found to be more plausible for 
artifacts than for natural kinds. For natural kinds, plausible 
property explanations contained mostly superordinates in 
either the ‘p’ or the ‘q’-position of the explanation. In 
contrast for artifacts the dominant property type in plausible 
explanations was function. Plausibility judgments of some 
property explanations in both domains showed symmetry, 
i.e. ‘p’ and ‘q’ were equally capable of explaining one 
another. In the regression, dependence (p>q) followed by 
both counterfactual measures turned out to be the strongest 
predictor of plausibility. However, as the correlations of 
dependence (p>q) with plausibility did not significantly 
differ from the correlation of counterfactual (¬q) with 
plausibility, no strong claims can be made about the 
superiority of dependence over counterfactuals as predictors 
of plausibility.  
The domain difference for plausibility and for 
counterfactuals between living natural kinds and man-made 
artifacts was significant. Despite the effect being rather 
small, artifacts had twice as many property explanations 
with high plausibility ratings as did natural kinds. One 
attempt to explain the domain difference might be by 
reference to the predominant property types in plausible 
explanations. Most of the plausible explanations for natural 
kinds contained a superordinate in either the ‘p’ or the ‘q’-
position of the explanation, whereas for artifacts a range of 
property types were explanatory. Thus, if natural kind 
property explanations were constrained by having to contain 
a superordinate in order to be plausible and only a fifth of 
all the explanations in our item pool contained a 
superordinate then the proportion of plausible explanations 
for natural kinds is inevitably smaller than that for artifacts.  
This raises the question of why superordinates are the 
only explanatory property for natural kinds. Intuitively one 
might say that the reason why living natural kinds have the 
properties they have, is because of some evolutionary 
processes that brought them about.1 Only superordinates 
might be considered to be associated with evolutionary 
processes and thus have explanatory value. Apart from that, 
                                                 
1
 Our sample of items only contained living natural kinds.  
properties in and of themselves don’t refer to or instantiate 
evolutionary processes that could be explanatory, therefore 
property explanations for natural kinds were less plausible 
overall.  
Furthermore, comparing the two domains, functions play 
a large explanatory role for artifacts, whereas for natural 
kinds, they are not explanatory at all (McLaughlin, 2000). 
The only functional properties generated for natural kinds in 
Cree and McRae’s (2003) database were functions that the 
entity had for humans, e.g. ‘horses are used for pulling 
things.’ But these kinds of functional properties do not 
readily explain why for instance the horse has certain 
features. Thus in the present study, functions of natural 
kinds were not explanatory.  
One might object that a human heart is a natural kind and 
that it clearly has a function that has explanatory power for 
its features. However this objection only holds if the natural 
kind is part of a self-reproducing system, where the function 
provides an evolutionary advantage and thereby explains its 
existence (McLaughlin, 2000). In the present case all natural 
kinds were complete entities, for which participants did not 
generate functions as their properties (Cree & McRae, 
2003).  
Artifacts conversely do have functions. Their existence 
seems to be based on the functions they are or were meant 
to perform. Most of their properties can be explained by 
reference to their intended function. Thus, for artifacts, 
having both superordinates and functions as explanatory 
properties resulted in the overall observed domain 
difference. 
But why are functions so explanatory for artifacts and 
superordinates so explanatory for natural kinds? 
Psychological essentialism (Medin & Ortony, 1989) may 
provide an account for both. Psychological essentialism is 
the view that we represent things in the world as having 
essences which bring about their properties and make the 
entities what they are. For natural kinds, superordinate 
properties are the most likely candidates to stand in for 
essential properties and therefore are most able to explain 
surface features of natural kinds.  
One view argues that for artifacts that intended functions 
constitute their essences (Bloom, 1996). The essential 
features bring about the non-essential properties in an entity 
and as a result are explanatory for them.  
Another view might simply be that functions in artifacts 
and superordinates in natural kinds constitute a common 
cause structure for their properties, which doesn’t rely on 
the idea of essences. The present study though was not 
equipped to distinguish between these two possibilities. 
Whether or not we hold the stronger view of psychological 
essentialism, what we found was that some kind of common 
cause structure underlies plausibility judgments for property 
explanations. The most likely candidates for these common 
causes were superordinates for natural kinds and functions 
for artifacts.  
A surprising finding made in this study was the symmetry 
that some of the explanations exhibited. If property 
explanations are predominantly based on causal relations as  
is thought to be the case for event explanations, then these 
explanations should not exhibit symmetry because causal 
 relations are asymmetrical (Salmon, 1998). One view might 
be that property explanations are not based on causal 
relations between the two properties and therefore are able 
to exhibit symmetry, which would undermine any account 
that mainly relies on causal relations (Sloman, 2005). 
However correlations between the symmetry of plausibility 
and the symmetry of counterfactuals were not significant, 
suggesting that for some items that were equally plausible in 
both directions, counterfactual judgments were only high in 
one direction.  
Another account of the symmetry might be that one of the 
directions is plausible in a diagnostic rather than 
explanatory way. “Flamingos are birds because they have 
wings” might be understood as ‘I can tell that flamingos are 
birds because they have wings.’ This may be a plausible 
account for natural kinds involving superordinates, however 
it would not explain the symmetry of artifact items like: 
“Sofas have cushions because they are used for relaxing.” 
Future studies will have to address this distinctive feature of 
property explanations. 
The regression suggested that the best way to model 
plausibility of property explanations was in the form of 
dependence net diagrams that capture the local aspect of 
conceptual coherence. Mutability in contrast captures the 
more global aspect of coherence by measuring the centrality 
of a property to its concept. The combined finding of the 
strong influence of dependence and the lack of influence of 
mutability on plausibility suggests that the local aspect of 
conceptual coherence is more important for plausibility 
judgments than the global. 
The present results are mostly in line with Thagard and 
Verbeurgt’s (1998) view of coherence as a constraint 
satisfaction model. In their view concepts are coherent sets 
of properties. Coherence depends on the relations between 
these properties. Certain relations might then be seen to 
provide stronger constraints than others. As in Quine’s 
(1960) idea of a coherent net of knowledge, certain 
properties are more difficult to remove from our conception 
of a concept because a number of other properties stand in 
strong constraint relations to them. They constitute local 
coherence constraints. Other properties of the same concept 
might not depend on any of these properties and may be part 
of their own local coherence net. Coherence under this view 
is a net of pair-wise constraint relations with some parts that 
are more tightly connected and others more loosely. 
This view provides an explanation for why conceptual 
coherence was so much more influential when measured as 
pair-wise dependence rather than as mutability. According 
to Sloman et al. (1998) dependence is a very general and 
basic notion. “Every directional, semantic relation between 
features can be treated as a generic dependency relation.” 
(Sloman et al., 1998, p. 204). Thus, when judging 
dependence, people are able to form a general impression 
that encompasses causal, logical or any other type of 
relation between the properties. With this view of 
dependence in place, we can see that judgments of 
dependence would incorporate the other measure of 
counterfactuals, co-occurrence and mutability, so that the 
dominance of dependence as a predictor of plausibility 
would follow directly. Future study will have to address 
both the symmetry and the domain difference in plausibility 
of property explanations.  
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